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In this paper I analyze the diffusion of a product innovation that was recently made 
available for licensed purchase within an industry with identical firms producing the 
same good.  The main assumptions are a decreasing yet always positive incentive to 
adopt the innovation, and an extremely high cost of immediate adoption, but which 
decreases over time passed since the innovation has become available.  The resulting 
equilibrium in the industry is a gradual adoption of the innovation rather than an 
immediate one, with each firm having an optimal time of adoption.  In the long-run 
equilibrium, as the number of firms in the industry becomes very large, it is also shown 
that the incentive to innovate does not disappear.  However, as the number of firms in 
the industry increases each firm is shown to have an incentive to adopt earlier.  The 
assumptions here, as well as the results of this model, match the results of recent 
studies in the empirical literature. 
Keywords: product innovation, long-run equilibrium, model 
JEL Classification: D21, D50 
Introduction 
The main assumption about the adoption of a product innovation in the literature is 
that it happens immediately after the period of monopoly allowed to the innovating 
firm.  However, evidence shows that such a process is more gradual and that diffusion 
indeed happens when it comes to product innovations, as well as to process 
innovations. Some of the reasonable explanations for why this happens are the very 
high costs of adjustment of immediate adoption, as well as the decrease in the profits 
from adoption with the number of firms that have already adopted.  In other words, 
firms weigh the costs and benefits of adoption in every period after the license has 
been made available and decide the optimal time to adopt. 
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In a recent empirical study, Mulligan and Llinares (2003) show that the incentive to 
adopt a quality-enhancing innovation by skiing areas decreases with the number of 
direct competitors that have already adopted the innovation.  Therefore, a diffusion 
process is found to occur even when talking about product innovations, not just when 
considering cost-reducing innovations.  The latter case was discussed by Reinganum 
(1981b), who showed that the only equilibrium in a concentrated industry producing a 
homogeneous good was one where firms adopted the process innovation 
sequentially.  In this paper, I will consider the adoption of a product innovation along 
with the effect of market structure on the resulting equilibrium.  Although the 
assumption regarding the magnitude of early adjustment costs is maintained, the 
effect of a product innovation on the total present value of profits works through 
different channels rather than a cost-reducing process innovation. 
Following Klepper (1996), the main assumption here is that when a firm adopts a 
product innovation, it can attract more buyers who have a preference for that product, 
and it can sell the good for a higher price than the price of the standard good.  This 
mainly happens because the introduction of the product innovation creates a new 
demand, since the innovation is a new product, and this demand usually represents a 
submarket of the original market, but to which only those firms who have purchased 
the license have access.  Therefore, it can be conceived that initially the number of 
firms willing to enter this submarket is smaller than the total number of firms given the 
relatively high costs of adoption and adjustment that this process would require.   
These firms will then make profits higher than in the original market, at least for a 
while, until all the firms eventually adopt the innovation. 
It is shown in this paper that even in the case of a product innovation, the equilibrium 
outcome is a diffusion process rather than the simultaneous adoption by all the firms 
in the market.  Furthermore, all firms have a positive incentive to adopt the innovation, 
albeit a decreasing one with the number of adopters.  It is also shown that the larger 
the size of the original market will be, the earlier each firm will decide to adopt the 
innovation, and that as the number of firms becomes very large the incentives driving 
the diffusion process do not disappear. 
 
The Model 
Let us consider an industry with n identical firms producing and selling a 
homogeneous good.  These firms are originally in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, 
producing a non-negative output and making non-negative profits.  When faced with a 
linear inverse demand, p(Q) = a1 – b1Q and having constant marginal cost c1, each 
firm will decide to produce q1
e and will make profits Ð1
e, given by the equations below: 
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At time t = 0 a product innovation becomes available to be licensed by any firm in the 
market.  This innovation, if adopted, provides access to the firm to a submarket, where 
the inverse demand is given by p(Q) = a2 – b2Q.  We can safely assume that since this 
is a submarket of the original market, a2 = a1  and b2 < b1, thus emphasizing the Institute of Economic Forecasting 
 





   
upward pressure on price which allows only a small number of new buyers to benefit 
from the innovation.  The Cournot-Nash equilibrium output of a firm in this submarket 
will be a function of the number of adopters, m = n: 











However, it is often also the case that the marginal cost of producing the new product is 
higher than the marginal cost of the standard good, c2 > c1, but simply assuming that a2 
– c2 > 0 ensures that there are important incentives to adopt the innovation.  With these 
conditions, we can conclude that the equilibrium price in the submarket is higher than 
that for the standard good, while the equilibrium output is lower (see Figure 1).  We 
further assume that the firm maintains the same level of output of the standard good, 
which is not affected by the number of adopters of the innovation.  Therefore, a positive 
profit in the submarket represents the main incentive for the firms to adopt. 
In addition, the firm is also able to sell this new product to a fraction α of its current 
customers at the new price.  Therefore, the increase in profits to firm i if it adopts the 
innovation, gross of adjustment costs, can be written as a function of n and m: 
  Π2
e(n, m) = [α q1
e(n) + q2
e(m)][ p2
e(m) – c2] (4) 
This profit is non-negative for all values of m, and a strictly decreasing function of m 
and n, thus illustrating the decreasing incentive to adopt an innovation as the number 
of adopters grows.  However, the incentive to adopt never disappears. 
Let the function y(t), defined for all non-negative values of t, represent the present 
value of all adoption and adjustment costs that a firm adopting the innovation at time t 
has to incur.  We assume that this is a convex and decreasing function of adoption 
time, but that after a certain time it starts to increase, thus emphasizing that cost-
saving from postponing adoption time cannot continue indefinitely.  These two 
conditions can be expressed as follows: 
 y’(t) < 0,  y’’(t) > 0 for all t є [o, ∞) and limt?8 y’(t) > 0  (5) 
Also, we would like to include a condition on y(t), which specifies that immediate 
adoption is too costly, except for the first adopter: 
 y ’(0) = – Π2
e(n, 1) (6) 
A final condition on y(t) ensures that the objective function in the maximization 
problem that will follow is strictly concave for all values of t: 
  ( ) ( ) ) 7 ( 1 , 2
rt e re n t y
− Π > ′ ′  
 
Equilibrium profile of adoption dates 
The present value of all costs and benefits to firm i when adopting the innovation at 
time τi can be written as a function of the adoption dates of all firms as follows: 
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identical, the exact ordering is not relevant.  Furthermore, this weak ordering of 
adoption dates does not eliminate the possibility that more than one or even all firms 
adopt at the same time.  It remains to investigate what profile of adoption dates 
constitutes an equilibrium under this setup. 
According to the above specification, the present value of the profits of the firm i 
increases if the present value of adoption and adjustment costs are counterweighted 
by the total benefits represented by the profits in the new submarket.  Each firm will 
choose its optimal adoption date, τi*, so that the above function may be maximized.  
Given the condition (7) on y(t), Vi(·) is strictly concave, and so the first order conditions 
are necessary and sufficient for finding the maximizing values of its arguments.  Using 
Leibniz’s rule, we obtain: 
  () () ) 9 ( 0 * , 0
*











for all i = 1, …, n.  Given that Vi(·) is strictly concave and continuous in all its 
arguments, these maxima exist and are unique.  Evaluating (9) for i = 1 and τ1 = 0 we 
obtain: 

















 which means that τ1* = 0.  In addition, 
()0 lim lim < ′ − =
∂
∂






τ τ  using (5), and so τn* < ∞.  In order to establish that 
indeed τi* is between τi-1* and τi+1*, we will evaluate (9) at each of these two values. 
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The above statement is true, since the exponential function is always positive and the 
function Π2
e(n, m) is strictly decreasing in its second argument.  Since Vi is concave, 
(11) shows that τi-1* < τi*, with a strict inequality sign due to the strictly decreasing 
submarket profit function in the number of adopters.  A similar argument shows that τi* 
< τi+1*.  Since in this analysis i is arbitrary, it follows that the ordering of all optimal 
adoption dates is strict: 
 0  =  τ1* < τ2* < … < τi-1* < τi* < τi+1* < … < τn-1* < τn* < ∞ (12) 
In order to show that the above profile of optimal adoption dates is a Nash Equilibrium, 
we must first define what we mean by a Nash Equilibrium in this context. 
Definition: A profile of adoption dates, τ = (τ1, …, τn) is a Nash Equilibrium if Vi(τ) = Vi 
(τ1, …, τi-1, τi’, τi+1, …, τn) for all τi’ є [o, ∞) and i = 1, …, n. 
To show that τ* from (12) is a Nash Equilibrium we need to reconsider the 
maximization problem of the firm i.  In finding the optimal adoption date for firm i, we Institute of Economic Forecasting 
 





   
have assumed that all other firms do not change their adoption dates as a result of 
changing τi.  Also, the maximizing value of ôi did not depend on the adoption dates of 
other firms.  Therefore, τi* from (9) was found for any given values of the other firms’ 
adoption dates.  This also applies in the case when all other firms adopt according to 
τ*, leading us to conclude that the optimal adoption date for firm i is also the Nash 
Equilibrium adoption date for that firm.  And since this is valid for any i = 1, …, n, we 
can conclude that ô* is a Nash Equilibrium profile as defined above. 
However, since all firms are identical, there will be n! as many Nash Equilibria, since 
there are n! possible permutations of numbers from 1 to n, but where the optimal 
adoption dates are always strictly ordered. 
Here it is interesting to comment on the economic reasons why an equilibrium where 
all firms adopt at the same time is not possible.  First of all, if there is such an 
equilibrium, then it will be at a date when it is optimal for all firms to adopt the product 
innovation.  Therefore, this date would be the maximizing value of τ for the following 
objective function: 




γ y dt e n n dt e n V
t e rt e
i − Π + Π = ∫ ∫
∞ − ∞ −  
As above, the first order condition is necessary and sufficient to find the maximizing 
value, τ*, which will be uniquely determined due to the strict concavity of Vi: 
  () ( ) ) 14 ( 0 * , 0
*




γτ y e n n
V e i  
In words, ô* will be the earliest date at which the present value of extra profits earned 
by a firm by adopting the innovation covers just the present value of all adjustment 
costs.  We know this date will be strictly greater than zero, since condition (6) 
specifies that immediate adoption is too costly for more than one firm.  Furthermore, 
this date is likely to be a relatively late date since  ( ) n n
e , 2 Π  is the smallest level of 
profit a firm can make in the new submarket.  We can now consider the decision of 
firm i at this point, given that all other firms maintain their adoption dates at τ*.  If firm i 
chooses to adopt at an earlier date than τ*, say τ’, it will increase its present value of 
the total profit flows by  () 0 1 ,
*
'
2 > Π ∫
− τ
τ
γ dt e n
t e .  Therefore, a profile of adoption dates 
when all firms adopt at the same time is not a Nash Equilibrium.  Also, a similar 
argument shows that any more than one firm adopting at the same time is not a Nash 
Equilibrium. 
 
The effect of the market structure on equilibrium adoption dates 
To see the effect of the market structure as determined by the value of n on the 
equilibrium values of adoption dates, we should reconsider the first order conditions 
from the above maximization problem: 
  () () ) 9 ( 0 * , 0
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The term on the right side of the equal sign is negative because profits in the new 
submarket are decreasing in the size of the original market.  Using condition (7), the 
sign of 
dn
d i * τ
 is negative (the term in the brackets is positive due to the concavity of 
Vi).  Therefore, an increase in n will decrease the value of τi*, meaning that as the size 
of the original market increases, firms will choose to adopt the innovation earlier. 
 
The case when n→∞ also leads to the diffusion of the product innovation.  The 
equilibrium adoption dates will be given by: 
  () ( ) [ ] ( ) ) 15 ( 0 *
*
2 2 2 = ′ − − −
−
i
e e y e c i p i q
i τ
γτ  
because lim n→∞ () i n
e , 2 Π  = lim n→∞ [α q1
e(n) + q2
e(i)][ p2
e(i) – c2] = q2
e(i)[ p2
e(i) – c2] and 
lim n→∞ q1






 = 0.  The same conditions as above apply here to 
show that the firms will adopt the product innovation sequentially.  The only difference 
is that as profits in the original market become normal, the incentive to adopt the 
innovation will be represented by only the positive profits made by adopting.   
However, as m → n, profits in this submarket will also go to zero. 
Conclusions 
Given the nature of incentives associated with a product innovation, it has been 
shown that a diffusion process of adoption is the only optimal result in a concentrated 
industry producing a homogeneous good.  The main economic reasons for an 
immediate and/or a simultaneous adoption of the product innovation are that the 
present value of adjustment costs is very high early, and that the present value of 
profits from adoption is decreasing with the number of adopters.  It has also been 
shown that as the number of firms in the market increases, each firm has an incentive 
to adopt the innovation earlier, and that as the number of firms becomes very large, 
the incentives driving the diffusion process do not disappear. 
As an extension of this model, an analysis of the outcomes in the market when both a 
product and a process innovation are available would be interesting.  One could look 
at the preference of the firms for either type of innovation and which type will be 
adopted sooner. Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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